2026 Tesla Model 3 Problems, complaints & recalls

contact stated that while driving at night, the auto-dimming rearview and side mirrors failed to dim properly, requiring the driver to wear sunglasses at night. The manufacturer was notified of the failures and informed the contact that diagnostic testing required an out-of-pocket fee. The failure mileage was approximately 57,525.

•no, my car has not been inspected yet. I have taken, Videos and have saved in car camera footage to show the ongoing defect. •no warnings lights or alerts prior to the incident. The problem first became apparent and clear Oct 26, 2026. I had FSD subscription that ended Oct 24, 2026 and the system warnings worked just fine during that time even while driving manually.

accident, and the driver did not have time to react and prevent the accident. This accident was due to a failure of the Tesla self-driving. The encrypted dashcam video was copied from the USB drive named [[redacted]], from the folder [[redacted]], and then accessed by logging into [[redacted]] and dragging and dropping the video file into the dashcam app. That was saved to our PC as [[redacted]}. Since the saved video did not show the telemetry data, the video was loaded into [[redacted]] and saved with the telemetry information visible. Another video was saved capturing the whole ExportDash.cam interface. That has bars showing where the car was actively steering, braking, or applying acceleration ("gas pedal"). This shows that the car was actively steering a second before the collision, but then stopped. There was no time for the driver to react to the car's failure to properly steer. The video showing the car in self-driving mode and failing to navigate a turn on the driveway can be accessed at this youtube link: [[redacted]] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

onto the shoulder of the road. The contact was advised to tow the vehicle to the dealer. The vehicle was towed to the dealer, but the diagnostic test report was not provided to the contact. The contact was informed that the information was reported to the engineers. The contact was advised to contact the NHTSA Hotline to report the failure. The failure mileage was approximately 450.

should not be allowed to run in self-drive without hands on the wheel unless the car is capable of avoidance of obstructions large enough to disable the car. This car is dangerous if it can operate at freeway speeds, hands free, and not have the ability to avoid obstructions that could cause it to be out of control.

had crept out far enough so that other vehicles coming from my left (in the right lane) had to swerve left to avoid hitting my car. There was another car behind my car so I could not "manually" back up (taking over from FSD) to remove the front of my car from the path of vehicles coming from my left. (If just one of the drivers of those vehicles coming from my left had been distracted, a likely collision with the front of my car could have occurred!) Eventually, there was a sufficient gap that I could (manually) make a right turn instead. Since this incident, I have had to preview the navigation map for every trip (before enabling FSD) and be prepared to route around any UPLs. After driving this car over 6500 miles (98 % on FSD), I have found FSD to be very safe overall! My only notable "risk of collision" event was the above-described UPL attempt! I have contacted Tesla Customer Service (via phone calls and online) on several occasions to report this hazard, but nothing has been done; (although on a live phone call, the representative acknowledged that others had also voiced my concern!) During a chat with Tesla's "Grok" chatbot, Grok stated that a 'Prefer Protected Turns' option would be a low complexity addition that could coexist with continued UPL improvement". Given this information, I think Tesla is being negligent by not adding the "Prefer Protected Turns" option to the vehicle user interface.

diagnostics and explicitly stated that internal logs flagged the FSD system performance as degraded or "suspect" since the beginning of September 2026. However, prior to the crash, the vehicle provided zero driver-facing warning messages, dashboard alerts, or mobile application notifications indicating that the automated safety systems were compromised or operating with a defect. 2. Telemetry Log Contradiction: Tesla's initial internal review claims that the vehicle's telemetry indicates an accelerator pedal override by the driver. I explicitly state that my foot was not on the accelerator pedal and no such override was physically made. There is an active sensor tracking or system logging discrepancy regarding driver inputs during this FSD failure. Evidence Maintained: I have preserved the complete, 4-angle synchronized TeslaCam dashcam footage of the incident on my computer as visual proof of the vehicle's un-accelerated 5 mph forward creep. Furthermore, I have submitted an official Data Privacy Request to Tesla to force the extraction of the raw, unredacted vehicle telemetry logs (DI_accelPedalPos) to legally dispute their pedal position claims. I am filing this report to assist NHTSA's active investigations into Tesla Autopilot/FSD traffic safety violations, specifically concerning automated braking failures and inaccurate driver-override telemetry classification.

driver to select the speed at which the car will travel, i.e. the speed limit, similar to adaptive cruise control found in most modern vehicles. When the operator of a vehicle is not in charge of the vehicle's speed, this is inherently dangerous.

becoming aware of the impact, I immediately applied the brake. There were no injuries. The collision resulted in damage to the right rear area of the vehicle. After the incident, I photographed and recorded the scene and vehicle damage and saved the available Tesla Dashcam footage. I also requested the vehicle data from Tesla. I am reporting this incident because the vehicle collided with a stationary structure while FSD (Supervised) was engaged and controlling the reversing maneuver. I do not know the specific technical cause of the incident. The vehicle and available recorded data can be made available for inspection upon request.

attempting to manually disengage FSD to correct these malfunctioning systems, the vehicle fails to smoothly transition control. Instead, it triggers critical red flashing alert lights, sounds severe warning chimes, and initiates an immediate, aggressive brake application - stopping the vehicle dead in active, live traffic. 2. PHANTOM BRAKING: The vehicle routinely experiences sudden, severe, and unprovoked phantom braking events while driving at speed, without any forward obstacles or environmental hazards present. 3. STEERING INSTABILITY: When navigating parking lot entrances, the vehicle exhibits extreme "indecisive behavior," resulting in violent, rapid shaking of the steering wheel before completing the maneuver. Tesla customer service was formally notified of these dangerous system behaviors on August 14, 2026. A formal remote engineering log review has been requested from the manufacturer, as these sudden braking actions in active traffic pose an immediate threat to public safety.

While this window is displayed, I cannot properly view or control functions such as music and other touchscreen features behind the area. This is especially dangerous because it appears immediately after I take manual control from FSD - a moment when my full attention should be on the road and the vehicle. The system effectively requires me to look away from the road and interact with the touchscreen before I can make another needed adjustment. This occurs every time I disengage FSD and is consistently reproducible. This behavior began after software version FSD v14.3.3. My vehicle is a 2026 Model 3. The problem occurred everytime while traveling at any speed. I believe this mandatory, non-dismissible overlay creates a serious driver-distraction hazard by obstructing the center display and requiring touchscreen interaction while the vehicle is in motion. Tesla should allow the feedback request to be dismissed, delayed until the vehicle is parked, or disabled entirely.

provide any collision warning, alert, or indication that a collision had occurred. After the initial contact, the vehicle continued moving and a second impact occurred shortly afterward, resulting in additional damage. Immediately after the second impact, the driver intervened and took control of the vehicle to stop the maneuver, before further damage is caused. My main concerns are: 1. Why did FSD fail to identify the adjacent vehicle before the maneuver? 2. Why was no collision warning provided before or after the initial contact? 3. Why did the vehicle continue the reversing maneuver after the first impact instead of stopping till driver intervention? 4. What if is pediatrician who qualify ADA, children, elder was in the position of the adjacent vehicle, this failed sensing would cause imparable result. I would appreciate a technical review of this event and a detailed explanation of Tesla's findings.