Tesla Model 3 Acceleration problems by year

through the black jacket with conductor and red insulation on the same flat face. No tooth marks, scalloped bites, shredded insulation, or nesting material - a shear, not rodent damage.Service Manager [[redacted]] first blamed a rabbit, then wrote it "was an example" and that Tesla does not need droppings, nesting, or chew marks to call a severed harness outside damage. He has no photos from the 8/18 install; the tech is on leave. Two emails to [[redacted]] went unanswered. Related BAR complaint filed (ref [redacted]).Rear wheel speed sensor feeds ABS, traction control, and Automatic Emergency Braking. Failure disables these safety systems. A part that fails days after Tesla service with an undocumented "cut," followed by a warranty denial based on inference rather than evidence, indicates possible workmanship or installation issues that could affect other vehicles. Requesting NHTSA review of Tesla's service practices for this component.Tesla Service Burbank, [[redacted]], [[redacted]]. [[redacted]], [[redacted]].[[redacted]], [[redacted]], [[redacted]] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

excessive speed. The human driver remains responsible for safe, lawful operation and faces possible speeding tickets. I have read reports describing maximum-speed control as an "anti-pattern." I do not consider that an adequate safety justification for removing a preventive control. Learning a driver's preferences should operate within an explicit speed ceiling. I believe Tesla has the engineering capability to develop and validate a solution that preserves both FSD functionality and effective driver control. I request NHTSA investigate and require a remedy if a safety defect is established. My position is that affected FSD systems should not operate on public roads without an enforceable driver-selected maximum speed, independent of driving profile. Manual braking and disengagement remain necessary but do not replace this preventive safeguard. I welcome contact from Tesla and am willing to collaborate on a solution. My willingness to help does not diminish my request for restoration of this safety control. Contact details are provided separately in this complaint. Exact software version and change date: UNKNOWN. Dealer/service-center confirmation: UNKNOWN. Inspection by Tesla, police, an insurer, or others: UNKNOWN. Prior warning lamps/messages: UNKNOWN. Availability for inspection: UNKNOWN.

PCS module did not break due to driver abuse, mechanical wear, environmental damage, or physical aging. It failed strictly because Tesla's proprietary software update process overtaxed, corrupted, or bricked the internal semiconductor boards during a forced rewrite command. A consumer should not be financially penalized for hardware damage caused by a manufacturer's remote software push.

driver to select the speed at which the car will travel, i.e. the speed limit, similar to adaptive cruise control found in most modern vehicles. When the operator of a vehicle is not in charge of the vehicle's speed, this is inherently dangerous.

already occurred and Tesla said the battery needed to be replaced. What concerns me even more was what happened after Tesla received the car. Tesla removed the battery and quarantined it in the parking lot. They told us in writing that it was removed because of coolant ingress as a safety precaution and that a specialized technician had to determine whether the battery was safe to discharge. During a phone call, a Tesla employee also told me they quarantined it because there was a possibility the battery could explode and they did not want anyone injured or anything damaged if that happened. That was alarming because my wife had just been driving this car, and afterward it sat in our driveway while we waited for it to be taken to Tesla. At no point were we told that the battery could be dangerous or that the vehicle should be kept away from people or property. We had no idea Tesla would consider the condition serious enough to quarantine the battery once they received it. Tesla later confirmed in writing that coolant ingress was the root cause of the battery failure. I would like NHTSA to look into why this condition was able to get this far without warning the driver and whether other vehicles could have the same issue.

automatically, which forced me to react in a corrective manner. Thankfully there was nobody behind me or the severity of the braking would have likely caused a rear end collision. To my understanding, this phantom braking is a known issue with Teslas, so I wanted to document my experience to add to the record. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

almost collided with me. Until such time as the Tesla system can recognize the 'sub text' on a speed limit - the FSD and Adaptive cruise should not be certified. I also drive a BMW i4 and this reads all signs correctly, only applying those applicable to a car to the vehicle.

The current version is more dangerous. If the same incident happened today, the driver would have no way to limit speed or prevent the system from repeating the error. The defect is the progressive removal of driver control from the Full Self-Driving system. Earlier versions allowed manual speed caps. Current software does not. This vehicle is U.S. registered and runs U.S. software on American roads. The same defect that caused this off-road incident in Mexico now exists without the safety net of manual speed control. The software is dangerous. The removal of driver overrides makes it worse. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

bad map data instead of reading visible signs. It will do 65 in a 55. It will not slow down when the sign says 55. The driver cannot force it to obey the posted limit. Speed control is gone. The driver is a passenger watching the car make bad decisions. This is not safe. This is not driver assistance. This is loss of control. NHTSA must require Tesla to return manual speed control immediately. A human driver must be able to cap the speed at all times. The current software removes that ability and creates a clear safety hazard.

I regained my bearings, I lifted my foot off the accelerator and the vehicle slowed down. At the time, I believed a serious crash was imminent. I was able to drive the vehicle home, which was about 1 1/2 miles away, but it is not safe to drive so I won't drive it until it is repaired. I am aware that Tesla and NHTSA have attributed many prior sudden acceleration incidents to drivers unintentionally pressing the accelerator when intending to press the brake. Due to the vehicle's regenerative braking, I rarely use the brake pedal during normal driving, which makes this explanation virtually impossible in my case. I am also aware that NHTSA reopened an investigation in 2023 after learning about a potential inverter-related design flaw that could cause sudden unintended acceleration in Tesla vehicles, and that this investigation remains open as of this writing.

FSD, a second event occurred and included approximately three rapid braking pulses. The occupants lunged forward during both episodes. On [redacted], the drive from [[redacted]] to the Ukiah Costco was normal. On the return toward [[redacted]], FSD suddenly braked hard at approximately 63 mph and reduced the vehicle's speed by about 25 mph, to approximately 38 mph. Family members and friends in the vehicle were startled and moved forward. Later that day, there were two additional unexpected braking episodes while traveling from [redacted] toward [redacted]. I used accelerator input to override the unwanted braking. The unexpected highway-speed deceleration created a risk of being struck from behind and made the system unpredictable to supervise. No crash, fire, injury, or property damage occurred. I do not recall a warning message before the braking. The vehicle has not been inspected or diagnosed for this issue and is available for inspection upon request. As of [redacted], the vehicle reports Tesla software 2026.20.3 and FSD (Supervised) v12.6.4; it has Hardware 3. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

approximately 70 mph; however, FSD limited the vehicle to approximately 65 mph and displayed warnings indicating that the higher speed was unavailable. While FSD remained engaged, the system initiated a lane change from the far-right lane into the center lane. After entering the center lane, the vehicle began displaying repeated warning messages and FSD disengaged multiple times. I attempted to locate settings related to the warnings on the touchscreen but could not identify an available adjustment. During the third disengagement, I perceived that the vehicle continued braking without releasing while steering resistance increased significantly. The steering wheel then rotated abruptly, and I was unable to regain normal directional control before the vehicle departed its intended travel path and struck a concrete median. The collision caused personal injuries and substantial vehicle damage. I have not been able to reproduce the condition. The incident was investigated by the Kentucky State Police. Based on the sequence of repeated FSD warnings, disengagements, continued braking, and abrupt steering behavior, I believe this event warrants investigation. I request that NHTSA review the vehicle's Full Self-Driving logs, telemetry, Event Data Recorder (EDR) data, steering and braking commands, diagnostic records, and software history to determine whether a vehicle or software malfunction contributed to the collision. Almost like someone had control, into the wall -KM